Orientalism, Afghanistan, and the Recycling Rhetoric
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The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was a turning point. As the policy had changed so did the rhetoric. Afghanistan was once again the unconquerable land of warriors. The Soviet should have been “buried in the mountains of Hindu Kush.” The myth of “undefeatable Afghans,” “born warriors,” and “soldiers of God” was reconstructed, propagated, and publicized. An “unholy” alliance of the CIA, Wahhabists, drug dealers, warlords, and religious fanatics was formed. Despite their criminal and malevolence atrocities they have committed in Afghanistan, a group of hand-picked Afghans, who were strongly backed by the US and her allies — Pakistan and Saudi Arabia — became the leaders of “Afghan resistance.” The CIA admitted that Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, one of the infamous “leaders” of the Afghan resistance, who was armed and supported by the US, has had “vicious” and “fascist tendencies.”[30] But the same CIA “considered him a useful tool for shaping the future of Central Asia.”[31] Since the old stratagem of the colonial approach by associating with any party that contributes to maintain the existing power structure was essential, the reverberation of the same discourse was also accepted. As lord Curzun called Abdur Rahman the “great Emire” at the end of the 19th century, the US senators admired their Afghan proxy-fighters during the Soviet-Afghan war at the end of the 20th century as well. The Democratic Party senator, Bill Bradly believed that the Afghan rebels were “developing a modern concept of independent, neutral Islamic state.”[32]
However, Orientalism, is a circular “relation” between the dominant and dominated. In the course of this relation there are images, which are constructed, and then destroyed, and reconstructed again for the Orientals by the dominant power. The US press published positive reports about Hekmatyar and other Afghan fighter during the Afghan-Soviet war. But, “[a] year after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan … the New York Times reported what it called the ‘sinister nature of Mr Hekmatyar.’”[33] The fanaticism, extremism, and “fundamentalism” of the former anti-Soviet warriors became the main public discourse. Although it has taken different forms, become more complex and categorized into ‘good’ and ‘bad’, the demonization and vilification of the US Cold War allies has continued to construe them as a prime enemy of “western civilization.”
The US invasion of Afghanistan after 9/11 has restored Afghanistan’s nineteenth century position as a semi-protectorate and geo-strategically important entity for existing global power. As Said argued, “Orientalism has successfully accommodated to the new imperialism, where its ruling paradigms do not contest, and even confirm, the continuing imperial design to dominate Asia.”[34] Today, the Oriental-colonial discourse, with all its denigrated rhetoric, racism, and supremacy, and despite its nuance and hyper-humanistic post-modern euphemisms, is flourished as a crucial mechanism for repossessing, reinventing, reclaiming, and reconsuming the Orient. Afghanistan has been a practical model and example for strategically important Orientalism. She has served as a ground for the “clash” of “western and the eastern values.” The myths of Afghanistan perfectly reflect the ontological conception of today’s Orientalism. Afghanistan has been the exotic land of beauty, romance, courage, and unconquerable tribes. She is rich, resourceful, and “pretty promising.” She can be “modern”, “free”, and “democratic” as long as the “west” conquers her, controls her or is in bed with her. On the other hand, Afghanistan is the kingdom of barbarism, fanaticism, backwardness, and irrationalism. Orientalism as a conceptualized and pragmatic “knowledge” recycles itself so to follow the path of power. Afghanistan will continue to be one of the important factors for understanding Orientalism.
Notes
[1] Edward Said. Orientalism. (Vintage Books, 1979), 2
[2] Mountstuart Elphinstone. An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul and its Dependencies in Persia, Tartary, and India.(Akademischen Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1815) 61
[3] Alexander Burnes. Cabool: a Personal Narrative of a Journey to, and Residence in that City, in the years 1836, 7, and 8. (William Clowii and Sons, 1843) Kindle Edition, 1317-28.
[4] Ibid. 1328-39.
[5] “U.S. Identifies Vast Mineral Riches in Afghanistan.” The New York Times. Published: June 13, 2010. Accessed: December 8, 2011.
[6] David Spurr. The Rhetoric of Empire; Colonial Discourse in Journalism, Travel Writing, and Imperial Administration.(Duke University Press, 1993) 31
[7] See, Said. Pg. 3 – 6
[8] See, Said. Pg. 23, 239 – 254
[9]G. Forster. In Marcus Schadl. “The Man Outside: The Problem with the External Perception of Afghanistan in Historical Sources.” Asien 104 (Juli, 2007), S. 88 – 105. Pg. 91
[10] Lady Florentina Sale. A Journal of the First Afghan War. Ed. Patrick Macrory. (Oxford University Press, 1969) Kindle Edition. 682-91
[11] Marcus Schadl. “The Man Outside: The Problem with the External Perception of Afghanistan in Historical Sources.”Asien 104 (Juli, 2007), S. 88 – 105. Pg. 92
[12] Ibid. 92
[13] “Ministers ‘united’ on Afghanistan." BBC. May 22, 2010. Accessed: December 8, 2011.
[14]See, Lady Florentina Sale. Kindle Edition, pg. 2276-86
[15] D.S. Richards. The Savage Frontier: A History of the Anglo-Afghan Wars. (Macmillan London Limited, 1990) 48
[16]Mir Ghulam Mohammad Ghobar. Afghanistan Dar Maseer Tarikh. (Jamhuri Publication, 1985) 443 – 477 and See also, D.S. Richards, Pg. 84
[17] See, Said. Pg. 12.
[18] Emir Sher Ali Khan, was the ruler of Afghanistan from 1863 to 1866 and from 868 until the second Anglo-Afghan war.
[19] H.B. Hanna.The Second Afghan War: Its causes, its conducts, and its consequences. Vol. 1 (West Minister, 1899) Kindle Edition, 4965-77 and 1354-67
[20] See, Ghobar, pg. 474, 666-668 and George Curzun. Lord Curzun of Kedleston: Tales of Travel. (Hodder & Sthoughton, 1923) 51-53
[21] See Ghobar, pg. 474 and Curzun, pg. 51
[22] Bob Woodward. Obama’s War (Simon & Schuster, 2010), 66.
[23] See, Ghobar. Pg. 471
[24] See, Tytler. Pg. 71-74, 126
[25] Suraj al Akhbar Afghania. Second Year. No: 1, 1912. Also See, Ghobar, pg. 475
[26] Peter Novick. That Noble Dream: The Objectivity Question and the American Historical Profession. (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 301-310
[27] See, Said. Pg. 291
[29] Henry S. Bradsher. Afghanistan and the Soviet Union (Duke University Press, 1983) 19
[30] Sonali Kolhatkar and James Ingalls. Bleeding Afghanistan: Washington, Warlords, and the propaganda of Silence.(Seven Stories Press, 2006) 9
[31] Barent Rubin. In Sonali Kolhatkar and James Ingalls. Bleeding Afghanistan: Washington, Warlords, and the propaganda of Silence. (Seven Stories Press, 2006) 9
[32] Ibid. 12
[33] Alfred McCoy in Paul Fitzgerald and Elizabeth Gould. Invisible History: Afghanistan’s Untold Story Afghanistan’s Untold Story. (City Lights Book, 2009) 195
[34] See, Said. Pg. 322
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28 December 2011, 13:36, by Turklar
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