Orientalism, Afghanistan, and the Recycling Rhetoric

The study of the “east” as a constructed concept, and the strong association of knowledge with the existing political, social, and economic power structure have created a contrived interpretation of the Orient and the Occident. Orientalism, as Edward Said defined, “is a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between the Orient and (most of the time) the Occident.”[1] The “knowledge” that has been produced as an outcome of the Orientalism is forceful, vibrant, changeable, and aligned with the political purposes of the western powers. It has provided the Occident with the political and military condition and rationale to dominate, to rule and to reconstruct the orient. However, the subject(s) of the Orientalist “thought” — the Orient— has stayed or must stay static, unchangeable, and intact. Thus, they were compelled to be ruled, guided, and supported. Afghanistan illustrates a clear and viable example in this regard. In this paper I argue how Afghanistan has served as a practical, conceptual, rhetorical, and unchangeable example of Orientalism. I further explore the colonial rhetoric which is constructed and reconstructed in relation to the political and military politics of global powers with Afghanistan.

Geography and appreciation of land were important factors for nineteenth century colonialist and Orientalists. The land of Afghans was portrayed as an exotic, unreachable, and strange place for centuries. The wonder of a gaze beyond the Khayber Pass and the myth of the unconquerable Hundu Kush Mountains were the dreams of many European adventurers and empires. Afghanistan was the land of beauty inhabited by “wild” Afghan tribes. The beauty of the land for Europeans was the means to connect with it. It was the source of pursuing deeper into it; it was provoking them to conquer it, to own it, to reshape it. Therefore, the early colonial travelers to Afghanistan constantly stressed the beauty of the land. Mountstuart Elphinstone was one of the first officers from the British East India Company who travelled to Afghanistan in a mission to the court of the Afghan Emir in 1808/9. He described Kabul in his travel account “the views up the east and west walks were beautiful, and each was closed by high mountains; but that of the space which runs from north to south, far surpassed everything that I have seen in an Asiatic garden. … The fountains were sparkling with the sun, whose rays shone bright on the trees, shrubs, and flowers on one side, and made a fine contrast with the deep shade of the other.”[2] But while the land and its resources are appreciated, there remains the problem of its inhabitants. Thus, a discourse of detachment, separation, and disassociation of the natives from their lands was generated and promoted. The rhetoric of doubt and reservation over the capacity of the natives to enjoy, explore, and exploit their land and its resources were constructed and publicized. Alexander Burnes, a colonial explorer, who travelled to Afghanistan on a political mission in 1836, described Afghanistan with astonishment: “beyond all this, rocky mountains are seen with the fresh snow of yesterday upon them; and over these again tower the eternal snow-clad summits of Hindoo Koosh. The scene was as sublimely grand as it was beautiful and enchanting.”[3] However, Burnes concluded that “it is a source of deep regret that this beautiful country should be inhabited by a race of men so turbulent and vindictive.”[4] In another example, almost two centuries later, on June 13 2010, the New York Times reported that “US identifies vast Mineral riches in Afghanistan. On the ground, it is very, very, promising. Actually it’s pretty amazing,” quoting Jack Medlin, an American geologist. The newspaper also quoted the man of power in Afghanistan, Gen. David H. Petraeus, commander of the United States Central Command at that time. He said, “There are a lot of ifs, of course, but I think potentially it is hugely significant.” However, the discourse of doubt over the competency of the Afghans has to be reconstructed, which the NYT subtly accomplished by arguing that “The corruption that is already rampant in the Karzai government could also be amplified by the new wealth, particularly if a handful of well-connected oligarchs, some with personal ties to the president, gain control of the resources. At the same time, American officials fear resource-hungry China will try to dominate the development of Afghanistan’s mineral wealth, which could upset the United States, given its heavy investment in the region. With virtually no mining industry or infrastructure in place today, it will take decades for Afghanistan to exploit its mineral wealth fully. This is a country that has no mining culture.” So, “The Pentagon task force has already started trying to help the Afghans set up a system to deal with mineral development.”[5] The point is that Afghanistan’s land is beautiful, resourceful and “amazing” but it is not for Afghans because “the colonizing imagination takes for granted that the land and its resources belong to those who are best able to exploit them according to the values of a western commercial and industrial system.”[6]

The manifestation of the colonizers right to the lands of the colonized requires power, which depends on knowledge about the subjected races. According to Said’s other definition of Orientalism, it is the institution that produces knowledge about the Orient, which is based on structural myths and lies.[7] The rhetoric of denigration, disparagement and vilification is one of the main elements of the “knowledge” about the Orient that simplifies it, rationalizes it, makes it understandable, and creates a complicated ignorance both in the Occident and the Orient. In the case of Afghanistan, the pejorative rhetoric has conceptualized and become the conventional notion. For instance, nothing in the common and so-called rational discourse in the west can better explain the issue of child marriages in Afghanistan than the “inherently backwardness” of the “barbaric” Afghans.

It should be pointed out that it would be a grave misconception to assume that the contemptuous undertone about Afghanistan was thoughtfully contemplated, constructed, and plotted by the “west.” However, it started within the discourse of Orientalism,[8] eventually coated with colonial prejudices, and become a pragmatic propaganda of power in its military and political encounter with Afghanistan.

One of the earliest colonial sources, which are full of the derogatory rhetoric about Afghanistan, is George Forster’s book, a journal from Bengal to England through the Northern Part of India, Kashmir, Afghanistan and Persia, and into Russia by the Caspian - Sea. George Forster was an employee of East India Company and travelled to Afghanistan in 1784. He was obviously disillusioned when he visited Afghanistan. He wrote, “I expected to see … the capital of a great Empire. But the Afghans are a rude, unlettered people, and their chiefs have little propensity to the refinements of life, which indeed their country is ill qualified to gratify.”[9] His view of Afghanistan set the stage for the later Orientalists and colonialists. The British invasions of Afghanistan and its direct confrontation with Afghans intensely increased the number of visitors, spies, military personnel and travelers who added more flavor to the contemptuous narrative about Afghanistan. Lady Florentine Sale, who was the wife of General Robert Henry Sale an important military Officer in the first Anglo-Afghan War in 1841, wrote in her diary that “The Afghans of the capital are a little more civilized, but the country gentlemen and their retainers are, I fancy, much the same kind of people as those Alexander encountered.”[10] Her views were constantly echoed in later accounts, though the narratives took different forms through time. Some narratives were concealed in the layers of the western “politeness” and “civility.” Others followed the typical trend with great impudence. Arthur Conolly, a British intelligent officer, who was later executed in Bukhara by the Russians, wrote “If dirt killed people, where would the Afghans be!”[11] An American, who lived in Afghanistan in 1910, referred to afghans as “liars and thieves, and there is nothing in the country but ignorance, greed, and Shaitani[evilness].”[12] In May 2010, British Defense Secretary, Liam Fox called Afghanistan “a broken 13th- century country.”[13] The narratives were constantly reproduced and used for different reasons.
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The British-Afghan wars in the 19th century, particularly the disastrous British defeat on the road from Kabul to Jalalabad in January 1842, transformed the rhetoric from a preconceived discourse of Orientalism to an official and political propaganda mechanism against Afghans. The “uncivilized” and wild Afghans had proven their savagery. The heinous crimes of uncivilized nations could not be left without response. There was a need to teach them a lesson, to conquer them, and to restore the honor of the civilized world. “Regarding our policy in attempting to keep possession of a country of uncivilized people, so far from our own… let our Governors-General and Commanders-in-chief look to that; but I have been a soldier’s wife too long to sit down tamely, whilst our honor is tarnished in the sight and opinion of savages. Let us first show the Afghans that we can both conquer them and revenge the foul murder of our troops,”[14] wrote Lady Sale in one of her letters from Afghanistan, which were debated in the British Parliament in 1842. The rhetoric of Lady Sale was reflected in the ferocity of a British soldier from General George Pollock’s army, also called the Army of Retribution, which entered Afghanistan in April 1842 to rescue Lady Sale and the other British captives. “ … A Kyberee [Khayberi] boy apparently about six years of age with a large knife, which his puny arm had scarcely sufficient strength to wield, engaged in an attempt to hack off the head of a dead sergeant. The young urchin was so completely absorbed in his savage task, that he heeded not the approach of a solider of the dead man’s regiment – who coolly took him up on his bayonet and threw him over the cliff.”[15]

Retribution eventually gave way to domination and control. The rhetoric helped the British to extend the constructed fear for further influence. Although Afghanistan has never become a direct colony of the British, the impudence narrative was instrumentalized to encounter the advance of the Russians. Savages cannot be trusted was common rhetoric in the British policy making circles regarding Afghanistan.[16] A direct interference for having a “friendly” government in Afghanistan was rationalized and wars were claimed to be necessary. The second British invasion of Afghanistan in 1879 was mainly based on the rhetoric of fear. Since Afghans were untrustworthy, a preemptive action was needed to deter the advance of Russians towards British-India.

Another practical use of the rhetoric is to illustrate the “moral power” of the dominant good and civilized “Occident” over the primitive and “uncivilized” “Orient.” The moral power of Orientalist discourse is the ability, rationality, and competency of the dominated west verses the irrationality, sluggishness, and immorality of the Orient. What “we” have, “they” don’t. “What “we” do and what “they” cannot do and understand as “we” do.”[17] Since the discourse is conceived to be the actual “knowledge” about the “Orient,” it has been instrumental to provide the moral supremacy for the dominated power in its political and military relation with the “east.” Lord Lytton, the British Viceroy in India, who declared war against Afghanistan in November 1878, believed that it is up to the “civilized” government of the British to decide what to do in Afghanistan. The Afghan Emir,[18] who “has used cruelly and put to death his own subjects,” cannot comprehend our friendship. “Trust me, or I will betray you; love me, or I will break you in pieces” were his commands to the Afghan Emir prior to the second Anglo-Afghan War.[19]

The contemptuous rhetoric has also served as a tool to vindicate and justify the Occident’s action in the exotic lands of Orientals. What “we” do is necessary to “get the job done.” The British alliance with Emir Abdur Rahman, who was notorious for his atrocities and massacres of minorities, particularly Hazaras in 1890s, was defended by many British sources. It was a required action on the British side to be friend with an iron Emir, who ruled over the barbaric tribes, and wild nations.[20] Lord Curzun wrote that his “friend” in Kabul told him that Abdur Rahman killed thousands of his own subjects. But Curzun still called him a “great man” and a “good friend” of the British, who had to rule on a “treacherous” and “murderous race.”[21] In another example, more than a century later, when President Obama took office in the White House there was a debate among ‘senior policy makers’ over the US support of the warlords in Afghanistan. Bob Woodward reported in his book, Obama’s Wars, that the question was “should we be in bed with [these] guys? The CIA argument was standard … It was necessary to employ some thugs if the Unite States was going to have a role in a land of thugs.”[22]

The dehumanization of the subjects is a central colonial feature. However, incorporation of the subjects into the colonial structure, which does not mean humanization of them, depends on colonial subjects’ loyalty to the colonizers. In other words, it requires their positive contribution to the colonial power structure. In colonial discourse, the designation of the supposed enemy with derogatory terms such as uncivilized and backward is related to the condition, which has been constructed by the colonizers to differentiate between the colonizers and colonized. Any attempts on the colonized side to change the condition in favor of the colonizers reduce the degree of contempt in the colonial rhetoric. It should be stated that this change is not permanent, and can be reversed at any time by the will of the colonizers. The dichotomy in the rhetoric about Afghan rulers in the colonial sources demonstrates a good example in this regard. It is solely based on Afghan rulers association with the British government. When Emir Dost Muhammad intended to go to war against the British to recapture the city of Peshawar in 1837, he was called a “drug-addict, ignorant, and filthy man.”[23] However, when he surrendered to the British with no fights, prior to the first Anglo-Afghan war in 1840, he was portrayed as a “Great Emir” who “possessed some of the genius of a born administrator.”[24] With the same rationale, when Emir Abdur Rahman placed the foreign affairs of Afghanistan under British control and Afghanistan became a semi- protectorate of the British, he was called a “great ruler” and Afghanistan became a “modern,” “civilized” country. Dr. Walter S., who was a member of the Royal Asiatic Society, at a conference in London in 1913, said that Afghanistan is not an eastern country anymore. Abdur Rahman worked hard to lay the foundation of a developed, civilized country, and now his son, Habibullah is taking a step further by implementing and adopting the real European civilization in Afghanistan.[25]

This paradoxical dichotomy has continued through the modern history of Afghanistan. The pragmatic propaganda of colonial rationale constantly echoed itself and created new faces, notions, and concepts. The triumphant and patriotic environment after World War II and during the Cold War which dominated the US political and social scene, led to a strong association of knowledge with power. Lionel Trilling stated in 1951 that “intellect has associated itself with power as perhaps never before in history.”[26] American Orientalism, more than the traditional sort that has existed in Europe, developed as a direct relation of military and political power of a new emerging empire with the Oriental world. As Said observed, it “derive[d] from such things as the army language schools established during and after the war, sudden government and corporate interests in the non-Western world during the postwar period, cold war competition with the Soviet Union, and a residual missionary attitude towards Orientals who are considered ripe for reform and reeducation.”[27] Research projects about the Orient were mostly carried by the Defense Department or its affiliated private institutes such as the RAND Corporation. An army of CIA agents, economic and political advisors, and USAID officers spread around the so-called “developing world” mainly Oriental lands. The US strategic interests in Afghanistan incorporated the British colonial discourse and colonial rhetoric, though it became more subtle and nuance. The discourse has been maintained and strategically employed. In the first couple decades of the post World War II era, new developments in the Near East and partition of the Indian subcontinent into India and Pakistan temporarily pushed Afghanistan into the second plan. The so-called Middle East experts in the new empire were busy with concerns about India-Pakistan and Arab–Israeli issues, and Afghanistan was an “exotic land beyond Northwest frontiers”[29]
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The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was a turning point. As the policy had changed so did the rhetoric. Afghanistan was once again the unconquerable land of warriors. The Soviet should have been “buried in the mountains of Hindu Kush.” The myth of “undefeatable Afghans,” “born warriors,” and “soldiers of God” was reconstructed, propagated, and publicized. An “unholy” alliance of the CIA, Wahhabists, drug dealers, warlords, and religious fanatics was formed. Despite their criminal and malevolence atrocities they have committed in Afghanistan, a group of hand-picked Afghans, who were strongly backed by the US and her allies — Pakistan and Saudi Arabia — became the leaders of “Afghan resistance.” The CIA admitted that Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, one of the infamous “leaders” of the Afghan resistance, who was armed and supported by the US, has had “vicious” and “fascist tendencies.”[30] But the same CIA “considered him a useful tool for shaping the future of Central Asia.”[31] Since the old stratagem of the colonial approach by associating with any party that contributes to maintain the existing power structure was essential, the reverberation of the same discourse was also accepted. As lord Curzun called Abdur Rahman the “great Emire” at the end of the 19th century, the US senators admired their Afghan proxy-fighters during the Soviet-Afghan war at the end of the 20th century as well. The Democratic Party senator, Bill Bradly believed that the Afghan rebels were “developing a modern concept of independent, neutral Islamic state.”[32]

However, Orientalism, is a circular “relation” between the dominant and dominated. In the course of this relation there are images, which are constructed, and then destroyed, and reconstructed again for the Orientals by the dominant power. The US press published positive reports about Hekmatyar and other Afghan fighter during the Afghan-Soviet war. But, “[a] year after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan … the New York Times reported what it called the ‘sinister nature of Mr Hekmatyar.’”[33] The fanaticism, extremism, and “fundamentalism” of the former anti-Soviet warriors became the main public discourse. Although it has taken different forms, become more complex and categorized into ‘good’ and ‘bad’, the demonization and vilification of the US Cold War allies has continued to construe them as a prime enemy of “western civilization.”

The US invasion of Afghanistan after 9/11 has restored Afghanistan’s nineteenth century position as a semi-protectorate and geo-strategically important entity for existing global power. As Said argued, “Orientalism has successfully accommodated to the new imperialism, where its ruling paradigms do not contest, and even confirm, the continuing imperial design to dominate Asia.”[34] Today, the Oriental-colonial discourse, with all its denigrated rhetoric, racism, and supremacy, and despite its nuance and hyper-humanistic post-modern euphemisms, is flourished as a crucial mechanism for repossessing, reinventing, reclaiming, and reconsuming the Orient. Afghanistan has been a practical model and example for strategically important Orientalism. She has served as a ground for the “clash” of “western and the eastern values.” The myths of Afghanistan perfectly reflect the ontological conception of today’s Orientalism. Afghanistan has been the exotic land of beauty, romance, courage, and unconquerable tribes. She is rich, resourceful, and “pretty promising.” She can be “modern”, “free”, and “democratic” as long as the “west” conquers her, controls her or is in bed with her. On the other hand, Afghanistan is the kingdom of barbarism, fanaticism, backwardness, and irrationalism. Orientalism as a conceptualized and pragmatic “knowledge” recycles itself so to follow the path of power. Afghanistan will continue to be one of the important factors for understanding Orientalism.

Notes

[1] Edward Said. Orientalism. (Vintage Books, 1979), 2

[2] Mountstuart Elphinstone. An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul and its Dependencies in Persia, Tartary, and India.(Akademischen Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1815) 61

[3] Alexander Burnes. Cabool: a Personal Narrative of a Journey to, and Residence in that City, in the years 1836, 7, and 8. (William Clowii and Sons, 1843) Kindle Edition, 1317-28.

[4] Ibid. 1328-39.

[5] “U.S. Identifies Vast Mineral Riches in Afghanistan.” The New York Times. Published: June 13, 2010. Accessed: December 8, 2011.

[6] David Spurr. The Rhetoric of Empire; Colonial Discourse in Journalism, Travel Writing, and Imperial Administration.(Duke University Press, 1993) 31

[7] See, Said. Pg. 3 – 6

[8] See, Said. Pg. 23, 239 – 254

[9]G. Forster. In Marcus Schadl. “The Man Outside: The Problem with the External Perception of Afghanistan in Historical Sources.” Asien 104 (Juli, 2007), S. 88 – 105. Pg. 91

[10] Lady Florentina Sale. A Journal of the First Afghan War. Ed. Patrick Macrory. (Oxford University Press, 1969) Kindle Edition. 682-91

[11] Marcus Schadl. “The Man Outside: The Problem with the External Perception of Afghanistan in Historical Sources.”Asien 104 (Juli, 2007), S. 88 – 105. Pg. 92

[12] Ibid. 92

[13] “Ministers ‘united’ on Afghanistan." BBC. May 22, 2010. Accessed: December 8, 2011.

[14]See, Lady Florentina Sale. Kindle Edition, pg. 2276-86

[15] D.S. Richards. The Savage Frontier: A History of the Anglo-Afghan Wars. (Macmillan London Limited, 1990) 48

[16]Mir Ghulam Mohammad Ghobar. Afghanistan Dar Maseer Tarikh. (Jamhuri Publication, 1985) 443 – 477 and See also, D.S. Richards, Pg. 84

[17] See, Said. Pg. 12.

[18] Emir Sher Ali Khan, was the ruler of Afghanistan from 1863 to 1866 and from 868 until the second Anglo-Afghan war.

[19] H.B. Hanna.The Second Afghan War: Its causes, its conducts, and its consequences. Vol. 1 (West Minister, 1899) Kindle Edition, 4965-77 and 1354-67

[20] See, Ghobar, pg. 474, 666-668 and George Curzun. Lord Curzun of Kedleston: Tales of Travel. (Hodder & Sthoughton, 1923) 51-53

[21] See Ghobar, pg. 474 and Curzun, pg. 51

[22] Bob Woodward. Obama’s War (Simon & Schuster, 2010), 66.

[23] See, Ghobar. Pg. 471

[24] See, Tytler. Pg. 71-74, 126

[25] Suraj al Akhbar Afghania. Second Year. No: 1, 1912. Also See, Ghobar, pg. 475

[26] Peter Novick. That Noble Dream: The Objectivity Question and the American Historical Profession. (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 301-310

[27] See, Said. Pg. 291

[29] Henry S. Bradsher. Afghanistan and the Soviet Union (Duke University Press, 1983) 19

[30] Sonali Kolhatkar and James Ingalls. Bleeding Afghanistan: Washington, Warlords, and the propaganda of Silence.(Seven Stories Press, 2006) 9

[31] Barent Rubin. In Sonali Kolhatkar and James Ingalls. Bleeding Afghanistan: Washington, Warlords, and the propaganda of Silence. (Seven Stories Press, 2006) 9

[32] Ibid. 12

[33] Alfred McCoy in Paul Fitzgerald and Elizabeth Gould. Invisible History: Afghanistan’s Untold Story Afghanistan’s Untold Story. (City Lights Book, 2009) 195

[34] See, Said. Pg. 322